Tashkent: Central Asia’s largest wind power project, with a capacity of one Gigawatt, quietly came online earlier this year. Built by state-owned China Energy Engineering Group (CEEC), bankrolled with European debt, and packaged by Saudi developer ACWA Power, the Bash-Dzhankeldy project represents a new model for international cooperation under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), its international mega-development project, but it also raises awkward questions for Brussels about who gets credit when the EU foots the bill.
According to Global Voices, CEEC has explicitly framed this project as a BRI flagship that marries Saudi Vision 2030 with China’s infrastructure-building ambitions, promoting the wind farms in a state-media livestream. The Bash-Dzhankeldy project is backed by two syndicated loans arranged by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), each comprising a USD 150 million loan on the EBRD’s own account, plus B-loans syndicated to other lenders, including French and German state funds. While EU institutions hold a 54 percent stake and treat the EBRD as a Team Europe actor, it remains independent, with shareholders including China (0.09 percent).
The EBRD appears to be taking steps to reform public procurement, with a Review of Procurement Policy and Rules listed by the bank as a key policy for review in 2025. The EBRD is only in control of public sector procurement and private sector clients are free to select suppliers or contractors they prefer, the EBRD said in a statement. However, while this distinction holds, it also highlights the limits of Brussels’ influence. Although the EBRD operates independently, it is often presented as part of the EU’s Global Gateway offer. The result is that EU-funded projects can, quite legitimately, be delivered by Chinese firms.
In the last five years, Chinese firms won 13 percent of EBRD public-sector contracts by value, versus 35 percent for EU contractors across its 38 operating countries, 13 of which are in the EU. Chinese companies have also been awarded more than EUR 1 billion worth of contracts for EIB-funded projects in countries outside the EU, such as Georgia, Senegal, and Tunisia. According to Elena Kiryakova at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), a think-tank based in the UK, this pattern suits China’s new model of the BRI. There’s been a noticeable shift globally towards China co-financing projects with multilateral development banks (MDBs), she said.
When the BRI first launched in 2013, projects were largely financed through loans from Chinese policy banks, typically tied to contracts awarded to Chinese companies. Since 2016, such lending has plummeted, driven by mounting caution toward high-risk financing, both in China and among recipient countries. Yunis Sharifi, a fellow for Central Asia at the China Global South Project, observes, host countries don’t want debt; they want investments, so we’re seeing more equity from Chinese firms and more international collaboration. Kiryakova also notes that a drive to increase equity participation, as well as tie-ups with foreign firms – what Beijing calls third-party market cooperation – are part of Beijing’s de-risking drive.
Although Chinese policy banks are reluctant to lend, Chinese state financial interests are still at play in Uzbekistan. The BRI’s flagship equity vehicle, the Silk Road Fund, owns 49 percent of ACWA Power’s RenewCo platform, giving it exposure to all post-2019 Saudi solar and wind assets. As of July 2024, state-owned China Southern Power Grid also owns a 35 percent stake in the Bash-Dzhankeldy project. According to Naser al-Tamimi, an expert on China-Middle East relations at the Global Institute for Strategic Research (GISR) in Qatar, clean energy is a cornerstone of deepening China-Saudi cooperation.
Saudi Arabia and China are expanding clean technology partnerships into Central Asia and Africa, al-Tamini says, noting that third-party market cooperation in Central Asia and Africa is currently limited, but has considerable growth potential. Two firms from the Gulf – ACWA Power and the UAE’s Masdar – dominate Uzbekistan’s rapidly expanding portfolio of renewable energy projects. Since 2019, Uzbekistan has signed at least 26 power-purchase agreements for solar and wind projects, aiming for a 40 percent renewables share in electricity generation by 2030. Nine were awarded through transparent auctions, but the government has since pivoted towards direct negotiations with power producers.
In total, ACWA Power and Masdar have won 19 of the 26 projects. Three of these 26 went to Chinese developers, three to French firms Voltalia and TotalEnergies, and two to Hyper Partners, a firm with widely reported links to the powerful Uyghur Abdukadyr family with roots in China. As contractors, Chinese firms have dominated, winning 14 of the 18 EPC contracts announced to date. Eleven of these involve European public finance – mostly through the EBRD, but also the EIB and state funds from Germany, France, and the Netherlands.
In total, ACWA Power and Masdar have won 19 of the 26 projects. Three of these 26 went to Chinese developers, three to French firms Voltalia and TotalEnergies, and two to Hyper Partners, a firm with widely reported links to the powerful Uyghur Abdukadyr family with roots in China. However, there have been limited efforts to level the playing field for European finance outside the EU. According to Ghiretti at RAND Europe, the EU has begun to appreciate and tackle the strategic importance of public procurement, but many blind spots and loopholes still exist – especially on how to deal with funding and participation in strategic projects in third countries.
Phil Cole, Director of Industrial Affairs at WindEurope, declined to comment on the case in Uzbekistan, but pointed to an EBRD-funded wind project in Romania that will be equipped with Chinese-made turbines, explaining, European funding for Chinese-made turbines goes against made-in-Europe messaging from Brussels. We’d hate for wind to go the same way as solar, says Cole, recalling how Europe’s solar industry was decimated by cheaper Chinese exports in the early 2010s.
Although the Gulf-China-Europe tie-up is dominant in Uzbekistan, it is also increasingly evident in Africa. In Egypt, a 1.1 GW wind project is being developed by ACWA Power and minority partner HAU Energy, a Dutch-incorporated Franco-Egyptian joint venture with equity participation from the EBRD. It will be built by PowerChina using turbines from China’s Envision Energy and is backed by a USD 700 million debt facility led by the EBRD, with additional funding from British and German state institutions. This project demonstrates the complexity of China’s BRI in 2025. For Beijing, multilateral cooperation allows China to mitigate risk and keep firms in play. The combination of Chinese engineering muscle and European finance is also a beneficial development for host countries. For Brussels, the gains are less clear. Positive or not, the cooperation certainly jars with the narrative of competition propagated through Global Gateway.
